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“Can the Policy Trilemma be Exposited in the Mundell-Fleming Framework?”
Abstract: There is a general recognition that there are deficiencies in the MundellFleming model. Nonetheless, Rose [2000] has stated that Mundell was the first to exposit
the Policy Trilemma, which identifies an intrinsic incompatibility among: high capital
mobility, fixed exchange rates, and monetary autonomy. We look for the source of
Rose’s claim.
All of Mundell’s formal modeling after 1964 assumes that capital mobility is zero, so we
look to earlier work for verification. The paper in Kyklos states clearly that in comparing
equilibrium positions, the impotence of monetary policy is independent of the degree of
capital mobility.
Two further claims deriving from that model are explored using a analysis which portrays
the asset markets consistently: that both the short- and the long-run equilibria are
independent of capital mobility; and that the speed of adjustment is higher the greater is
capital mobility. We find that in every case these results are overturned in the portfolio
balance model.
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I. Introduction
Even in today’s globalized world, monetary policy continues to play a large role in
macroeconomic stabilization, despite some Central Banks’ managing their exchange
rates. Such activity seems to run counter to the dictum of the Policy Trilemma (Obstfeld
et al [2004]), that autonomy of monetary actions is incompatible with such conditions.
The reason such policy is rendered ineffective is that in such a setting foreign exchange
market operations are very close substitutes for open market operations in domestic
market instruments. The foreign exchange market operations needed to stabilize the
exchange rate offset the effects of the monetary initiative.
This paper investigates the connection between the degree of capital mobility and the
effects of monetary policy, both in the context of the Mundell-Fleming model, and using
a simple portfolio balance framework. One’s intuition is supported most closely in the
portfolio balance framework, which is comfortable with the notion of substitutability
between market instruments. Nonetheless Andrew Rose [2000] has said that Mundell
was the first to exposit the Incompatible Trinity, and we undertake to analyze this claim.
Mundell’s modeling of capital mobility has had an unusual arc, which we delineate in the
second section of this paper, showing that after 1964 all his formal analysis assumed that
capital mobility is zero. Nonetheless his earlier work did emphasize capital movements,
and we look at it in order to attempt to find the source of Rose’s allusion.
The Mundell-Fleming model remarkably finds that in both the short- and the long-run,
capital mobility has no impact on the equilibrium generated by an open market operation,
as is confirmed by the analysis of Swoboda [1972], among others. The speed with which
the economy moves between these equilibria, the argument continues, is positively
related to the degree of capital mobility, with the speed becoming indefinitely large as the
degree of capital mobility goes to perfection.
Not only do the results of a portfolio balance model conform to one’s informed intuition,
they also contradict those of the Mundell-Fleming model on every point. Thus, shortand long-run equilibria depend on the degree of capital mobility, but so too does the
speed of adjustment. Counter to one’s unaided intuition, the speed of adjustment tends to
depend inversely on the degree of capital mobility, contrary to what the earlier model
concludes.
One case in which the speed is independent of the degree of capital mobility is that for a
sterilization regime. Such a regime, and the possibility of its instability, is analyzed
below. Far from being a “disequilibrium system” (Mundell [1961a]), such a regime is in
many ways analogous to other, more familiar regimes, such as those employing
unsterilized foreign exchange market operations.
The paper concludes by emphasizing the importance of using a consistent specification of
asset markets, including the recognition of a wealth constraint. It is argued that as
Mundell and Company rushed on to the Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments
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(Frenkel and Johnson [1976]), and the introduction of rational expectations into the
macromodel (Dornbusch [1976]), many problems were left unsolved. It seems
appropriate to look at those problems again, and to return to the solutions generated by
the Mundell-Fleming model, because those solutions too deserved to be reconsidered in
the context of a consistent model of an open economy.
II.

The Evolution of Mundell’s Modeling of Capital Mobility

Mundell’s work is noted for analyzing the effects of capital movements on the economies
which place no restrictions on the mobility of capital across their borders. The Nobel
Committee writes of Mundell that he did his most important work in “…the interesting
special case with perfect capital mobility.” (Persson [ 2000, xii]) Dornbusch has
succinctly characterized this contribution as dealing with “…the functioning of an
economy with an open capital account.” (Dornbusch [2000, 199]) While it is true that
Mundell did write such a paper, (Mundell [1963], as well as a follow up to it (Mundell
[1964]), the fact is that these are the only places in which he makes this assumption. A
convincing argument can be made, that the inspiration for adopting such an assumption
was the noteworthy results which Fleming [1962] had identified in his article which was
written about two years and more before Mundell’s capital mobility papers were
published. Despite Mundell’s being immediately under Fleming in the Special Studies
Division of the Research Department at the Fund at the time, Mundell did not cite his
boss’s work.
Previous to this Mundell had introduced capital mobility into the analysis, but the
argument was that while the dynamics might be modified by its presence, the equilibria
were not. And any modifications of the dynamics were quite minor, so that Humean or
Keynesian adjustment mechanisms continued to play a role in a recognizable way. In the
paper where this argument first appears (Mundell [1961a]) there is no claim as to the
degree of capital mobility. Ironically, it is the low capital mobility case that is portrayed
in the figures in the article, in which the FF locus is steeper than LL (as we repeat in
Figure 1 below).
Also relevant to this point is the extent of capital mobility in other early papers (Mundell
[1960], [1961b], and [1962]). It is true that in all these papers capital mobility has a role,
and that in the first of these the role is central. But the key point about capital mobility in
such papers is that the analysis is inconsistent unless mobility is less than perfect. The
term that is used in one of these paper is that capital can range up to being “almost
completely mobile” (Mundell [1960, 237]), but it can not be perfectly mobile.
Perfect capital mobility, which one finds in Mundell [1963], seems like the natural
destination for this assumption, and that once one had reached it he would deviate from it
only with a clarifying explanation. This is clear from the observations that one finds in
that paper. Namely, that the assumption “…will overstate the case, but it has the merit
of posing a stereotype towards which international financial relations seem to be
heading.” (Mundell [1963, 475]). The conclusion from this analysis is enunciated in
breath-taking fashion: “perfect capital mobility implies different concepts of stabilization
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policy from those to which we have become accustomed in the post-war world.”
(Mundell [1963, 484])
It is therefore very striking that in all subsequent modeling Mundell assumes that capital
mobility is zero. This is a conscious choice made in at least one case involving the
argument about Growth and the Balance of Payments: “The conclusions do not depend
on capital mobility, but they remain valid when such mobility exists, so we shall assume
capital is completely immobile.” (Mundell [1965, 135])1 Every chapter in Mundell’s
second theory book, Monetary Theory, takes capital mobility to be zero.
There is a persuasive argument that capital mobility has little to do with some of the
subjects covered in Mundell’s later work: Growth and the Balance of Payments, and the
Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments. But the same cannot be said about
“Uncommon Arguments for Common Currencies,” (Johnson and Swoboda [1973]) in
which the absence of a non-monetary financial instrument is precisely what causes
consumption to fluctuate in step with output in the flexible exchange rate case. In a fixed
rate regime, in contrast, money is tradable. It follows that fluctuations in consumption
need not mimic those in output, since money balances can be run down or accumulated,
depending on whether the consumer wishes to consume more or less than her income
(output).
To put this in perspective, just seven years after Mundell was writing that it is was “…not
far from the truth…” that Brussels could not sustain an interest rate differential with
Amsterdam and Zurich (Mundell [1963, 475]), he was making the assumption that such a
differential among the same financial centers can be maintained at any level, because
capital movements are absent. It is extraordinary to think that Europe embarked on the
path that led them to monetary union on the basis of a model that said that capital markets
between the various countries did not exist.
III.

Policy Trilemma

The Policy Trilemma is the observation that there is an “…intrinsic incompatibility of
perfect capital mobility. (b) fixed exchange rates and (c) domestic monetary autonomy.”
(Rose [2000, 215]) Rose claims that Mundell was the first to exposit this “incompatible
trinity.”
If Mundell were the first to exposit this idea, then it would have to be in his early papers,
since after 1964 all his models assumed that capital mobility was zero. Therefore the
most likely source for such an exposition is in the work that was done in the early sixties,
when capital mobility was positive, and especially in the checkerboard square papers
(Boyer and Young [2006]) which deal with both fixed and flexible exchange rates and
both monetary and fiscal policy. These papers include Mundell [1961b] and [1963] (as
1

This paper was first presented at a lecture at Princeton University in 1965. In addition, Mundell’s most
famous zero capital mobility paper [1968b] was presented at a seminar in the Research Department of the
IMF in 1962 or 1963. This shows that even in the early sixties Mundell was willing to assume capital
immobility.
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well as Fleming [1962]). Also, the paper in Kyklos looks promising because it takes an
extended look at the consequences of an contractionary monetary initiative.
By looking at this set, we are ruling out other papers mentioned above (Mundell [1960],
and [1962]). We do this because these papers have an “unacceptable” definition of
monetary policy as Mundell realized soon after writing them (Mundell and Swoboda
[1969, 262]). If the Trilemma means anything, it is that all of the elements which go into
it are necessary. Notably, one needs to have a well-defined view of what monetary
autonomy means, and this requires a suitable definition of monetary policy. In Mundell
[1960] monetary policy is not even defined, whereas in Mundell [1961b] it is portrayed in
a way which Mundell soon after “…no longer liked or accepted.” (Mundell and Swoboda
[1969, 262]) The argument is that using the interest rate as a gauge of monetary policy is
inappropriate, especially as capital mobility becomes high.
Mundell is consistent in his claim that with flexible exchange rates monetary policy can
function effectively, even in the perfect capital mobility case. Therefore we do not need
look exclusively at papers which treat both exchange rate regimes, that is, only at the
checkerboard square papers. But to look just at Mundell’s most famous paper does not
provide a basis for the Trilemma. Since that paper deals only with the perfect capital
mobility case, it can not establish that such an assumption is necessary for the inefficacy
of monetary policy. It could be that perfect capital mobility is just one case, perhaps of
an infinity, for which monetary policy is impotent.
A far better approach would have been to have capital mobility captured as a parameter
which is permitted to go to zero or infinity. This is precisely what Fleming [1962] does,
which supports our view that that paper is an outstanding contribution to the literature.
The Mundell paper to which we should look is Kyklos (Mundell [1961a]), for it shows
that under fixed exchange rates monetary policy has an impact on output and
employment which is independent of the degree of capital mobility in the short run. And
has no impact on these variables in the long run, even if prices are sticky. It demonstrates
quite clearly that the key concern is whether the policies of the central bank are such as to
let the economy attain its long-run equilibrium. But given that it is attained, monetary
policy has no impact on output and employment, no matter what the degree of capital
mobility, including even zero (Mundell [1961a, 165]) or infinity.
The argument in this paper is worth repeating, so we do so in the next section.
IV.

The Inefficacy of Monetary Policy in the Mundell-Fleming Model

This diagrammatic framework is so familiar, it is standard tool for teaching open
economy macro at the intermediate level. This discussion is based on Figure 1 in the
Kyklos paper.
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Figure 1: Adapted from Mundell [1961a].

This is an “internationalized IS-LM framework,” in which XX is the locus of points of
equilibrium in the goods market, LL is the equilibrium locus in the money market, and
FF is balance in the foreign exchange market. This framework is used for an analysis of
the consequences of
“…a Hume-type experiment in which a fraction of the money supply is
‘annihilated overnight.’ From an initial equilibrium position passing through Q
the LL curve shifts upward and to the left to, say L’L’, raising interest rates and
lowering money income, generating a new equilibrium in the markets for goods
and money at Q’. But Q’ cannot be a position of overall equilibrium…The LL
curve thus begins a gradual shift back to its original position, the only one which
permits equilibrium at the point Q.” (Mundell [1961, 157]
We should note that this Hume-Polak conclusion about monetary neutrality in the open
economy does not depend on the degree of capital mobility. The curves shown in this
figure present the low-capital-mobility case, in which FF is steeper than LL. But the
argument in the high-capital-mobility case would be identical. Since the LL locus is the
only curve which is shifting both in the short run and as the economy returns to the full
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equilibrium, its relative slope with respect to FF is not germane to the process that is laid
out here. So long as we are considering only equilibrium positions, the results presented
here should hold no matter what the degree of capital mobility.
The ineffectiveness result for monetary policy under fixed exchange rates shown in this
analysis could not have been considered a novel one, as the discussion in Kyklos makes
clear. This conclusion had been in the modern literature since 1957, as is shown by the
following quotation from Polak [1957, 10]:
“…A temporary expansion of credit (terminated, but not reversed, after the end
of, say, one year) will, by itself, bring about
(1) a temporary increase in money income and the stock of money;
(2) a temporary increase in imports and a permanent reduction of reserves equal
in size to the credit expansion.”
Since the mechanism that lies behind this result is of quite ancient origin, as is widely
recognized, this conclusion can validly be attributed to Hume [1752], even if his
statement is highly stylized, and entirely in a verbal form.
A. The Short-Run ‘Equilibrium’ Is Independent of Capital Mobility
The equations which lie behind these curves are worth presenting because they reveal a
number of further observations about the model. Most notably, that the short-run
‘equilibrium’ in the model is independent of the degree of capital mobility. The appendix
to Fleming’s [1962, 378-79] points this out clearly, and is likely the reason that he did not
take the limit as capital mobility becomes indefinitely large in the fixed exchange rate
regime.
This model is captured by the following equations:
X(e/P,Y,r) = 0
(1)
+ -L(Y,r) = M/P
(2)
+∆M = k·{T(Y,e/P) + K(r)}
(3)
- +
For this system we have: equilibrium in the goods and services market (1) (where X is the
excess demand for domestic goods); equilibrium in the money market (2) (where L the
demand function for real money balances); and possible disequilibrium in the balance of
payments (3), in which case the money supply is changing in a no-sterilization fixed
exchange rate regime. In this equation, k is taken to be a constant, reflecting the fact that
in modern financial systems, there isn’t a one-for-one relationship between the loss in
international reserves and the change in the money supply. T stands for the trade account
surplus, and K for the capital account surplus. In all cases, the effects on the values of
the functions of the variables is shown by the signs which appear beneath them.
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In this system: P is the domestic price level; e is the exchange rates, measured as the
price of foreign exchange in terms of domestic currency; Y is domestic output (income); r
is the domestic interest rate; and M is the domestic money supply.
What this system portrays is the short-run equilibrium in which there is the possibility of
“external disequilibrium.” In that timeframe the quantity of money may be changing even
though its level may be given. The movement to the long run relies on the argument that
eventually the money supply must adjust to a level which generates balance in
transactions with the rest of the world.
In the world of Keynesian aggregate supply for which P is constant, but Y may vary, the
first two equations, representing the XX and LL loci, determine the equilibrium values of
r and Y in the short run. Since capital mobility does not have any influence on the
positions or slopes of XX and LL, it cannot have any impact on their point of
intersection. Furthermore that point gives the values of Y and r in the short run, and
therefore capital mobility can not be a determinant of the values of these variables.
B. The Long-Run Equilibrium Shows Inefficacy, No Matter What Degree of
Capital Moblity
The same argument shows that the long run equilibrium is independent of the degree of
capital mobility. In that timeframe the change in the money supply is driven to zero.
Equation (3) in the model above then becomes one in two variables for the fixed
exchange rate case (if we continue with the Keynesian assumption that P is given).
Combined with the goods market condition, we again have two equations in two
unknowns.
In general the degree of capital mobility will be an important influence on the long-run
equilibrium, but in this case the shock is entirely monetary, so only equation (2) is
affected, and only in the short run. Since the long-run equilibrium takes place at the
intersection of XX and FF, and since neither of those loci has shifted, it is clear the longrun equilibrium is independent of the degree of capital mobility.
This result, while not as startling as our short-run conclusion, certainly merits further
attention for non-monetary shocks. But in the present case we are faced with the
conclusion that nothing depends on capital mobility, contrary to the big fuss which
Mundell made about it is 1963.
C. The Speed of Adjustment Is Higher the Greater Is Capital Mobility
The results reported above have been spelled out in admirable detail in Swoboda [1972].
He further points out that it is the speed of adjustment between these two equilibria which
is the important influence of the capital mobility parameter in the Mundell-Fleming
model for the fixed exchange rate case.
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This conclusion can be seen clearly from the diagram above. If we take the short run
equilibrium after the “monetary annihilation” as given, but we permit the degree of
capital mobility to increase, this has two effects on the diagram. Most clearly, the slope
of the FF locus falls in value, so that line comes closer to a horizontal position. But the
second point is that any position off the FF locus now represents a greater imbalance in
international payments than had existed previously.
In particular, at point Q’ the balance is now in greater surplus than it was in the low
capital mobility case. The trade account has the same value as before, but now the higher
interest rate value at Q’ means that more capital is drawn into the economy, and that the
money supply is augmented more rapidly. Since the adjustment mechanism relies on the
movement of the money supply, this more rapid change means that the speed of
adjustment to the equilibrium is more rapid.
V.

A Consistent Model of a Small Open Economy

Now all the results that we noted above, may be plausible, but they are hardly intuitive.
One would think that the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign assets
would be a crucial parameter in determining the nature of the short run equilibrium. On
the other hand, if one focuses attention on monetary neutrality, and if the exchange rate is
indeed fixed, then there is not much flexibility to the position of the long-run equilibrium.
But it is the result about the speed of adjustment that is the most counterintuitive. What
does the degree of substitutability have to do with the speed of movement from one
equilibrium to another? Indeed, isn’t the more plausible argument that the speed of
adjustment should be slower for the high capital mobility case, because the short-run
equilibrium is such that quantities and yields are brought into closer conformity with their
long-run values. This leaves less need and less pressure for adjustment, and therefore a
lower speed of adjustment of the economy. These conclusions are precisely what we
derive below.
The model we now present is a variant of portfolio balance models which we popular
during the period 1960-85. They never held center stage because so much attention was
given instead to models expounding the Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments,
or which focused on the nature of expectations in the international financial markets, such
as we see in Dornbusch’s [1976] celebrated “overshooting” model. While this model
does not have that glamour, it does provide consistency in thinking about open economy
macro problems, because it accommodates the wealth constraint that is a key ingredient
in thinking about asset markets.
This model can be found in Boyer [1975], Branson [196???], Branson and Henderson
[1985], Dornbusch [1980???], McKinnon [1966], Marston [1985].
The diagrammatic framework, shown in Figure 2, is very similar to that of the MundellFleming model, but the crucial difference revolves around the third locus: FF in Mundell,
but BB in many other portrayals. What the portfolio balance models contend is that the
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position of this locus must depend upon asset supplies. With this change it is still the
case that the money supply, when pegging of the exchange rate is carried out through
non-sterilized foreign exchange market operations, is such as to shift the LL locus so as
to slot through the intersection of the other two curves.

L’

X

r

L

B

Q

B

L’
L

X
Y

Figure 2: A Portfolio Balance Model

This can be shown most easily using Marston portrayal of an open market operation. Two
of the three curves which he considers are familiar: XX represents equilibrium in the
goods market, and LL represents equilibrium in the money market. The difference now
is that the third curve captures the points where demand for the domestic bond (whose
rate of return is shown on the vertical axis of the figure) is equal to an exogenously given
quantity supplied of them, and this quantity is typically portrayed as being zero.
As Dornbusch [1980???, ???] has emphasized, the LL locus in essence does not exist, in
the sense that to draw it one must postulate a given value for the money supply and for
the price level. Since the very point of the discussion of fixed exchange rates during the
1960s was that the money supply is an endogenous value for an open economy, the

12

function of the LL locus is not to determine equilibrium, but rather to serve as a gauge to
see how much the money supply must change (thereby shifting the LL locus by a
commensurate amount) so as to get LL to slot through the intersection of the XX and BB
loci.
Another striking similarity with the Mundell-Fleming literature is that the slope of the BB
loci depends precisely as indicated on the degree of capital mobility, where that
parameter is captured in the notion of the degree of substitutability between domestic
bonds and foreign bonds (which are called, synedochally, foreign exchange). Namely,
with high substitutability, the BB locus is close to horizontal, whereas with low
substitutability there is an upper bound on its slope, namely to equaling that of the LL
locus. That is, the wealth constraint says that BB can not get steeper than LL.
VI.

Short-Run Effects of an Open Market Operation Depend on Capital Mobility

In this diagrammatic framework it is easy to show that the equilibrium in the short run
(for a given level of nominal wealth, when portfolio readjustments have been
accomplished) depends in an intuitive way on the degree of substitutability between
domestic bonds and foreign exchange.
The diagram captures the effects of an open market operation by using a two-step
procedure. The first step portrays the size of the disequilibrium which the open market
operation creates, while the second step shows the manner in which the disequilibrium is
eliminated through portfolio rebalancing. This is shown in Figure 3.
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The economy is assumed to start in equilibrium, which is denoted by point Q. At that
point the loci for the three markets, shown in blue, intersect each other. The
contractionary open market operation represents a shock to two of these markets, and the
loci for them are therefore displaced to the positions shown in red. The leftward, upward
shift in LL was shown previously in the Mundell-Fleming analysis. In contrast, the
similar movement in the domestic bond market equilibrium locus represents a divergence
from the previous analysis. The argument is that the increased quantity of domestic
bonds which is now present in the open market will be voluntarily held only if the yield
on those bonds is higher than previously. Alternatively, at a given value of that yield,
equilibrium will hold in this market only if the level of output is lower, reflecting the fact
that demand for bonds is assumed to be negatively related to the level of output. (This is
consistent with the wealth constraint in that with fixed nominal wealth, a higher level of
output increases demand for money (as is conventional in the literature), which must
imply that demand for other financial assets is reduced.) (A similar argument with
respect to foreign exchange justifies the left shift of LL being greater than that of BB, so
that their intersection moves in a northwesterly direction.) Since we are assuming that
capital mobility is high, the movement of the intersection between LL and BB is closer to
horizontal than is XX. That is, that intersection now lies to the left and below that locus.
This shows the disequilibrium which is created by the open market operation. The
resolution of this disequilibrium, if foreign exchange market operations are used to peg
the exchange rate, is to permit the money supply to rise somewhat, as the Central Bank
purchases foreign exchange in the open market to counter the pressure on the exchange
rate to fall. Since there is no further change in the quantity of domestic bonds in the open
market, its locus does not adjust further. Therefore given that we have specified the
position of BB, that locus together with the XX locus determine the position of the new
equilibrium. It is shown in the figure as point Q’. In order to have the money market
clearing as well, the quantity of money must rise, but by less than its initial decrease, and
that is shown by the rightward shift in LL, taking it back partway to its initial position.
The various colors of the curves that generate the new equilibrium are explained as
follows: since XX is not shifted, it is shown in blue. BB is at the position to which it
was displaced by an exogenous shock, and therefore it is shown in red. And LL is the
endogenous response, dictated by the policy regime which is in place (namely, fixed
exchange rate, with pegging effected by foreign exchange market operations), and is
shown in green.
The question immediately arises as to how capital mobility influences the comparative
statics of this shock. Once again, the answer can be seen in the two steps which we have
distinguished above. The slope of the LL locus, and its displacement due to a decrease in
the money supply are both independent of the degree of capital mobility. In contrast, for
the BB locus, only its leftward displacement is independent of the degree of capital
mobility. But since higher capital mobility causes BB to become closer to horizontal, the
displacement of the intersection between LL and BB moves more in a westerly direction,
and moves less in a northerly direction.
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The immediate conclusion is that both output and interest rates move by less the higher is
the degree of capital mobility, as is obvious from the intersection along an unshifted XX
locus being closer to the initial equilibrium than otherwise. But it should also be noted
that the adjustment of the money supply after the initial open market operation is larger
the greater is the degree of capital mobility. In the limit of perfect capital mobility, the
only variables whose values change as a result of an open market operation are domestic
credit and international reserves, a result which we associate with Polak and Mundell.
The focus here has been on the short run. An extension to this analysis would look also
at the long run. Of particular interest would be equilibria under a whole array to
exchange rate regimes which satisfy monetary neutrality. Since that criterion includes
that the value of the interest rate must be the same as it was originally, it is likely that
capital mobility has little impact on the long-run equilibrium in that case.
VII.

The Effect on the Current Account

We do not analyze the complete path of adjustment for this economy as it moves from the
short-run equilibrium to its new steady state, but the tools which we have developed
permit us to see whether the speed of adjustment depends positively on the degree of
capital mobility, as the Mundell-Fleming model contends. The presumption is that only
the attainment of the target level of real wealth is the mechanism at work. There is no
analysis of the way in which changing values of interest rates in the short run may alter
the level of investment and therefore the capital stock which the economy has in its
productive resources. But since these would depend positively on the degree of
movement of yields due to the shock, it is hard to see how the speed would be increased
when higher capital mobility puts a limit on the extent to which the yields actually move.
The key to seeing how capital mobility influences the speed of adjustment resides in
noting that the open market operation had no influence on the position of the XX locus.
The short-run equilibria that we are comparing are along the same such curve, and
therefore we can identify how the balance between income and expenditure is changing
as we move from one to the other.
Since the XX locus represents the set of points for which the domestic goods market
clears, we can identify those points with the equilibration of a very familiar equation:
S + T – I – G = CA.
Moving in a northwesterly direction along XX moves us to points of lower values of Y
and higher values for r. Any conventional specification of CA would argue that these are
points for which the value of the current account is higher than its value previously.
If we started in a steady state for which the value of CA is zero, then after the
contractionary open market operation, this country is experiencing a current account
surplus. That is, its expenditure is less than its income, so its nominal wealth in the form
of credits against the rest of the world is increasing.
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In thinking about the movement to the long run, it is natural to envisage the fullemployment variant of this model, because in that timeframe the aggregate supply curve
is likely to be much less elastic than it is in the short run. This variant of the model
supposes that nominal income varies because the price level does. It is therefore natural
to place the price level as the endogenous variable on the horizontal axis of out diagram.
This change is made in Figures 4 and 5.
The question arises as to the consequences which the increase in nominal wealth which
we deduced from our previous diagram will have on the system. Will it cause the
economy to move away from its long run equilibrium, because the increase in wealth will
cause income to exceed expenditure by even more? Or will it cause the economy to
move back towards its long-run equilibrium, because the increase in wealth will cause
expenditure to exceed income, so that the extra wealth will eventually be dissipated? We
will see that the conclusion depends on the exchange rate regime which we portray.
VIII. Speed of Adjustment to the Long Run
The framework which we have used above can be augmented with a single curve, in
order to provide us we the tools we need to identify the speed of adjustment to the long
run. Namely we need to identify the position of the locus of points for which the current
account is equal to zero. In the initial, long-run equilibrium which we have identified this
curve must have passed through the point of intersection of the loci shown, since by the
very nature of that term, if the current account were different from zero, the position
would not be one of a steady state. The fact that credits or debits with the rest of the
world were accruing, means that further adjustments would be needed in order to allow
the system to settle down and reach a position that can be sustained indefinitely.
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Identifying a point on this locus is just the beginning. What is the sign of the slope of this
locus? To answer this question we need to be more specific about the nature of the
determinants of the current account. For simplicity we assume that the level of
expenditure in this economy is dependent on the level of wealth and on the value of the
domestic rate of interest. Specifically, we assume that total expenditure does not depend
on the real or nominal values of the exchange rate.
If expenditure depends positively on real wealth and negatively on the value of the
interest rate, then it can be shown that not only is the locus of points for which
expenditure is equal to income negatively sloped, but that it is closer to horizontal than is
the XX locus. The initial equilibrium, with this curve drawn in, is shown in Figure 4.
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Of equal importance is the displacement of this locus as nominal wealth increases. This
is easy to characterize, since we are portraying the simple specification outlined above.
In Figure 5 the initial equilibrium is denoted by Q. The horizontal displacement of EE is
equal, in percentage terms, to the increase in wealth. The reason is that at a given interest
rate, if real wealth is restored to its previous value, then expenditure should be the same
as previously. Real wealth has the same value as before when the increase in nominal
wealth is paired with an equal percentage increase in the value of the price index.
The increase in nominal wealth shifts the other curves in the diagram in ways that easily
understood, specifically we hold constant the values of: the quantities of domestic bonds,
and money; and the value of the exchange rate. An increase in nominal wealth due to an
increase in foreign exchange causes the displacements of these curves which are shown
in Figure 5.
For convenience of exposition we assume that nominal wealth increases by ten percent,
and the price level initially is equal to one.
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The shifts in the other curves in the figure are straightforward. If the quantity of
domestic bonds is initially zero, then the argument above applies to the BB locus as well.
Namely, an increase in nominal wealth combined with an equiproportionate increase in
the price index restores equilibrium to this market. That is, a ten percent increase in the
quantity of nominal wealth, combined with a ten percent increase in the price level keeps
the quantity of real wealth unchanged. Since the quantity of domestic bonds is zero, the
same value of interest rate should cause the domestic bond market to clear. Thus, the
horizontal displacement of BB, due to a ten percent rise in nominal wealth, is rightward
by ten percent.
It can be shown that XX, too, shifts right as a result of an increase in nominal wealth, but
its displacement is less than ten percent. The reason is that the exchange rate is held
constant in drawing this locus. As a result, a ten percent increase in the domestic price
level has two effects on the goods market: it decreases real wealth by ten percent; and it
increases the relative price of domestic goods by ten percent. An increase in nominal
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wealth of ten percent offsets that first effect, but fails to offset the change in relative
price, thereby leaving an excess supply in this market. Only if the increase in domestic
prices is somewhat less than ten percent is equilibrium restored in this market when
nominal wealth is increased by ten percent. Thus the horizontal displacement of XX is
less than ten percent.
Finally, the LL locus is displaced to the left as a result of an increase in nominal wealth,
specifically in the form of an increase in foreign exchange. That increase creates an
excess demand for real money balances, since it is a normal asset. To raise the quantity
of real money to match the demand for it, the price level must be reduced. In the process
the quantity of real wealth will rise, but the price index effect will more than offset that,
and equilibrium will be restored to the money market.
This analysis of the displacement of these curves due to an increase in nominal wealth
can now be put to a useful purpose. Namely, this same analysis shows the disequilbrium
that results from an exogenous increase in nominal wealth. What we wish to focus on
here is the size of the imbalance between expenditure and income in two cases: when the
Central Bank follows a policy of pegging the value of the exchange rate by using
unsterilized foreign exchange market operations, and when it pegs using sterilized foreign
exchange market operations. For the remainder of this section we shall assume that the
Central Bank does not sterilized.
For the unsterilized case, the analysis proceeds just as it did before. Pegging of the
exchange rate means that the XX locus has the position shown, since it is drawn for a
given value of the exchange rate, and we have assumed the current value in setting the
position of that locus. BB, too, is portrayed appropriately, as the quantity of domestic
bonds, set as zero, is held constant through this exercise. It is the LL locus which must
shift because the quantity of money is an endogenous variable in this exchange rate
regime. Therefore, as in the analysis in the previous section, the new equilibrium is
shown appropriately, as the intersection of XX and BB, with LL shifting downward and
to the right to slot through that point. This point is denoted by N.
Since the EE locus is the set of points for which expenditure is equal to income, it follows
that the amount of distance between any particular point in the figure and that locus
represents the size of the difference between expenditure and income. For example, since
the point N is below the EE locus, it is a situation in which expenditure is greater than
income. This is stabilizing influence, as the increased nominal wealth is being reduced in
size over time. Had N been further to the south and/or to the west of the position shown,
the difference between expenditure and income would have been even greater, as the
distance from the EE locus would have been larger.
We can now deal with the question of the effects of capital mobility on the speed of
adjustment when the exchange rate is pegged using non-sterilized foreign exchange
market operations. We are thinking about how the distance between point N and the EE
locus is influenced by the degree of capital mobility. The only curve in this figure whose
slope depends on capital mobility is that of BB. Note as well that the horizontal distance
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between point Q in the figure, and the horizontal displacement of BB is ten percent,
independent of the degree of capital mobility. It follows that the precise point of
intersection between BB and XX depends on capital mobility only to the extent that it
affects the slope of BB.
As capital mobility increase, BB becomes closer to horizontal, and its intersection with
XX moves into greater proximity with EE. It follows that the speed of adjustment is
reduced as the degree of capital mobility increases. This can be understood intuitively as
being the result of the fact that higher mobility constrains yields to move less than they
would have otherwise. This means that there is less pressure for adjustment coming from
this source. As a result the speed of adjustment is diminished.
(We have noted above that the money supply also moves back towards it previous value
in the portfolio readjustment we portrayed above. It is true that foreign exchange
holdings change by a greater amount the higher is the degree of capital mobility. But
since foreign exchange and domestic bonds are better substitutes the higher is the degree
of capital mobility, this mechanism also can be seen as a way of moving the economy
back towards its long run equilibrium.)
IX Sterilization Reconsidered
This framework allows us to investigate more fully the process of sterilizing the balance
of payments. We have a framework which portrays explicitly the tools which the
authorities would use in order to carry out this process.
The consequences of sterilizing a balance of payments surplus is shown in the figure
above. The idea is that the economy has increased its holdings of foreign exchange by
running a current account surplus. One possible response on the part of the Central Bank
is to buy some (or all, or even more) of that foreign exchange, but not in terms of money,
instead to trade it for domestic bonds, keeping the quantity of money circulating in the
system constant.
With a higher level of domestic bonds available, yields on those bonds would have to be
higher in order to convince agents to hold them. This higher yield would make holding
money less attractive. But since nominal wealth is higher, there is greater than previous
desired money holdings. A yield higher by just the required amount would offset this
wealth effect, and leave money holdings precisely where they were before. In terms of
targets and instruments, we are thinking about a situation in which the Central Bank is
using two instruments: open market operations and foreign exchange market operations.
To hit two goals: a given quantity of money, and a given value for the exchange rate.
(Alternatively, if one takes as given that only sterilized foreign exchange market
operations are to be used, there is that one instrument, but only one remaining goal, to fix
the value of the exchange rate, since we have taken as given that the money supply will
not change, in light of the single instrument that is being employed.)
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Now perhaps the most remarkable aspect about this observation is merely that it asserts
that sterilization can have some identifiable effects, on a par with those that arise in other
forms of exchange rate pegging (using non-sterilized foreign exchange market
operations, or open market operations). It is not a disequilibrium system, contrary to
what Mundell has called it. It does not generate a partial equilibrium or an external
disequilibrium. In every way it comparable with more familiar policy regimes. (It does
however require ever larger foreign exchange reserves to maintain a given equilibrium, as
capital mobility goes to infinity.)
What is also true about sterilization is that it has the potential to lead to instability. This
is apparent from the figure we have employed above. For this model in order to be stable
an increase in nominal wealth must lead to a current account deficit. This was
demonstrated in the case of exchange rates being pegged through the use of unsterilized
foreign exchange market transactions, as in shown by position N in the figure. In
contrast, for a sterilization regime the new equilibrium is at point S. Since that point will
lie on either side of the EE locus, this regime potentially is unstable. This possibility will
arise when the interest elasticity of money demand is small, and the interest elasticity of
saving and investment is very large. This is the case shown in the diagram, which is the
unstable case.
What is interesting about this criterion is that the slope of the BB locus, reflecting the
degree of capital mobility, is not a factor influencing the possibility of instability. Thus
the degree of capital mobility will not determine whether the system is unstable. This is
contrary to some conventional wisdom on the subject.
X. Conclusion
The Policy Trilemma is a deduction of portfolio balance models of an open economy, for
the simple reason that the foreign exchange market operations that are needed to peg the
exchange rate are more similiar to the open market operations that are used in the policy
initiative. As has been noted many times in the past, the reduction in domestic credit that
a contractionary open market operation entails is just matched by an expansion in the
holding of international reserves, as intervention is undertaken to hold down the value of
domestic currency.
But for other models of the open economy this process is derived in a system that fails to
distinguish between portfolio rebalancing and asset accumulation. As a general
conclusion from the Hume-Polak-Mundell-Fleming view, it is clear that monetary policy
is ineffective no matter what the degree of capital mobility. Since this is true, high
capital mobility is not an essential element. It follows that the Policy Trilemma can not
be exposited in the Mundell-Fleming framework.
Perhaps the next question which arises concerning the term Policy Trilemma is, Who was
the coiner of this term? That must wait until another paper.
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